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Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in 
the presence of an anonymous external donor.  The external funds are used in two different 
settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public 
good are affected.  The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lump-
sum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, 








Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good:   
Experimental Evidence 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Laboratory experimental research on the provision of public goods has focused primarily 
on decision making in what is referred to as the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). In 
the most standard VCM decision setting, a group is comprised of a fixed number of individuals. 
Each individual is endowed with resources that can be allocated to either a private good that 
benefits only the individual (the private account) or to a pure public good that benefits all 
members of the group (the group account). The benefits are structured so that group earnings are 
maximized if all endowed resources are allocated to the group account. Each individual, however, 
has an incentive to free ride on the group-account allocations of other group members by 
allocating their resource endowment to the private account. 
 One topic addressed in the experimental public goods literature is institutional 
arrangements that reduce collective action problems by creating incentives that facilitate 
cooperation. The research reported here examines voluntary contributions to a public good in the 
presence of an external source of resources that are used for matching the contributions of group 
members. Two matching settings are examined. In the first, referred to as lump-sum matching, a 
publicly announced fixed level of resources from the external source flow to the group account 
only if the internal contributions of group members reach or exceed a pre-announced threshold 
level. In the second, referred to as one-to-one matching, each resource unit contributed to the 
group account is matched by the external source up to a publicly announced maximum level. 
Undertaking a controlled laboratory comparison of these alternative matching-fund settings is 
motivated by the observation that both arrangements are commonplace in fund drives for the 
provision of public goods in field settings (e.g. public radio fund drives). 
 These changes in experimental settings can be thought of in the following way. Assume a 
public good is to be partially funded through voluntary contributions. Further assume that the 
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fund drive organizers have prior funding commitments that can be used for matching other 
potential donors’ contributions. From the perspective of agencies receiving contributions, the 
strategic question is what type of institution makes best use of the matching funds. As discussed 
below, in the standard VCM environment matching funds create incentives where equilibrium 
strategies exist that lead to non-zero provision of the public good.  
The free rider problem is particularly relevant for charitable giving, volunteerism, and 
other forms of philanthropy. While some of these activities can no doubt be rationalized as 
privately optimal, and in this respect no different from other economic activities, a significant 
amount of these activities entails personal sacrifices in order to improve social outcomes. This 
research is informative about the origin of such behaviors and their maintenance within social 
groups, since experiment participants experience similar incentives, albeit in a more abstract 
setting. By focusing on such a setting, the effect of economic incentives per se is investigated and 
comparisons are made that control for other factors that may affect behavior.  In this context, the 
research reported here studies the role of alternative philanthropic institutions for promoting 
charitable contributions and explores how such institutions affect individual incentives, behavior, 
and resulting group outcomes relative to a known socially optimal outcome that maximizes the 
group’s monetary earnings. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes related literature.  Section 3 
provides details of the experimental design and procedures.  Section 4 presents experimental 
results, and conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
2.  Related Literature 
There is a substantial literature in experimental economics studying the VCM decision 
setting.  The stylized facts emerging from this type of experiment are that contributions to the 
group account exceed the standard economic prediction of zero tokens, but are below the socially 
optimal level of 100% percent contributions.  There is, however, considerable heterogeneity 
across individuals in their choice of contributions and across decision making settings where 
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group size and the relative payoffs of the public good to the private good are varied. (See, for 
example, Ledyard [1995] and Isaac, Walker, and Williams [1994].)  
 Because outcomes in public goods settings have tended to be sub-optimal, researchers 
have investigated ways to foster cooperation through, for example, face-to-face communication, 
sanctions, and rewards. In addition, several scholars have investigated institutional changes that 
relate more directly to the research reported here. Eckel and Grossman (2003) examine charitable 
contributions in the context of a one shot, individual choice environment, referred to as a 
“modified” dictator game. Given endowments, subjects choose a contribution level to actual 
charities under alternative subsidies. Rebate and matching mechanisms are investigated that, 
under suitable parameterizations, are functionally equivalent. Holding monetary incentives 
constant, gross contributions are greater in the case of matching. One explanation for this 
phenomenon is purely framing; subjects may view the act of contributing with matching in a 
more favorable context than a rebate, leading to greater overall contributions. More recently, 
Karlan and List (2006) report the results of a field experiment that examines the impact of 
matching funds on contributions to a non-profit organization. Their design examines the impact 
of one-to-one matching funds under 1-to-1, 2-to-1, and 3-to-1 matching ratios. They conclude that 
matching increases both the probability of contributing and the magnitude of contributions, 
however, varying the matching ratio does not have a significant impact. 
 In addition, from the perspective of strategic behavior, the literature on provision-point 
public goods relates closely to the lump-sum matching setting investigated here.  See Marks and 
Croson (1998) for a review of this literature. The addition of a provision point to the VCM 
decision setting designates a publicly announced minimum level of resources that must be 
allocated to the public good in order for the public good to yield a positive return. If the provision 
point is not met, a refund condition is specified. Under a no-refund condition, if the provision 
point is not met any contributions to the public good are lost and yield no return to the 
contributors. In contrast, under a full-refund condition, contributions are returned when the 
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provision point is not met. If the provision point is exceeded, a rebate policy must be specified for 
how such contributions will be used. The provision-point setting leads to multiple Nash 
equilibria. While all individuals allocating zero resources to the group account remains a Nash 
equilibrium, the group income-maximizing Nash equilibrium is to meet the provision point 
exactly.  Nevertheless, exactly reaching the provision point can be achieved by multiple 
combinations of individual allocations.  This implies a distributional conflict across subjects, 
where some subjects may attempt to free ride on the allocations of others. 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.A.  The Decision Settings 
This study incorporates three basic decision settings:  lump-sum matching, one-to-one 
matching, and a no-matching baseline. All decision settings utilize variations of the VCM 
framework of Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994), henceforth referred to as the standard VCM 
setting.  Individuals made decisions in fixed groups of size N. At the start of each round, 
individual i was endowed with Zi tokens which were divided between a private account, earning a 
constant return of pi per token, and a group account, earning a return based upon the total number 
of tokens allocated by the group. Tokens could not be carried across rounds. For a given round, 
let mi represent individual i’s allocation of tokens to the group account and ∑mj represent the sum 
of tokens placed in the group account by all other individuals (j ≠ i). Each individual earned 
[G(mi +∑mj)]/N cents from the group account. Because each individual received a 1/N share of 
the total earnings from the group account, the group account was a pure public good.  At the end 
of each decision round, subjects were informed of their group’s allocation to the group account, 
as well as their earnings for that round. Subjects were not informed of the individual decisions of 
group members. 
The experiments were parameterized with subjects in groups of size N = 4 and individual 
endowments of 25 tokens per round. The return from each individual’s private account was one 
cent per token, and the group’s return from a token placed in the group account was G'(·) = 2.4 
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cents.  Defining the marginal per-capita return from the group account (MPCR) as the ratio of 
private monetary benefits to private monetary costs for moving one token from the private 
account to the group account yields MPCR = G'(·)/N = 0.60.  
Under the assumption that it is common knowledge that subjects maximize own-earnings 
and play a finitely repeated game with a commonly known end point, the sub-game perfect non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium in this standard VCM setting is for each subject to allocate zero 
tokens to the group account. As discussed below, however, the settings that incorporate matching 
funds have important consequences for equilibrium predictions. Finally, note that the payoff 
dominant Pareto optimum in the standard VCM setting, and for all decision settings investigated 
in this study, is for subjects to allocate all tokens to the group account.  
Lump-Sum Matching  
 In addition to the instructions for the standard VCM setting, subjects were informed that 
if total allocations to the group account met or exceeded 60 tokens, the group account would 
automatically have an additional 60 tokens added to it from an “external source” of tokens, with 
the earnings from these additional tokens being identical to those allocated by group members.1   
Lump-sum matching creates a discontinuity in the payoffs associated with the group 
account at the point where the subjects meet the minimum threshold of 60 tokens. This property 
of the payoff function implies strategic elements to the game that lead to alternative Nash 
equilibria. In particular, similar to experiments with provision points, there are now multiple Nash 
equilibria.  While all individuals allocating zero tokens to the group account remains a Nash 
equilibrium, the group income-maximizing Nash equilibrium is to meet the lump-sum matching 
threshold exactly.  Thus, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is 15 tokens from each group member, 
but any other (asymmetric) combination of group-account allocations that exactly meet the lump-
sum match threshold is also a Nash equilibrium. From a non-cooperative perspective, subjects 
                                                 
1 Subjects were explicitly informed that the external source was a computerized robot player, and loaded 
words such as “donor” or “contributor” were not used to describe the external source.  Similarly, tokens 
were “allocated” to the group account, rather than “donated” or “contributed”. 
 7
have an incentive to free ride on the allocations of others if they expect others to allocate 
sufficient funds to the group account to meet the lump-sum matching threshold. On the other 
hand, from a game theoretic perspective, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of 15 tokens per group 
member may serve as a focal point for subjects (see Marks and Croson [1998]).  
It is important to note a key difference between this setting and the provision point setting 
discussed above. In the lump-sum setting, if allocations to the group account do not meet the 
minimum requirement of 60 tokens, those tokens are still utilized as group-account allocations 
and generate earnings for the group. In the provision-point environments studied to date, if group 
account allocations do not meet the provision point, those tokens are either refunded to the private 
account or lost, depending upon the particular setting under investigation.   
One-to-One Matching 
Subjects were informed that each token allocated to the group account, up to a group 
maximum of 60, automatically led to an additional token being added to the group account from 
an external source. The group account earnings generated by each additional external token was 
identical to those internally allocated by the four group members. 
The experiments with one-to-one matching create an increase in the marginal gain from 
allocations to the group account up to the maximum level of matching. Since the experiment is 
parameterized with an MPCR = 0.6, one-to-one matching implies an MPCR of 1.2 for group-
account allocations up to 60 tokens. This property of the payoff function implies the existence of 
multiple Nash equilibria. In particular, an allocation to the group account that is matched yields a 
marginal return to the group member above the $0.01 per-token opportunity cost. In this setting, 
all group members allocating zero tokens to the group account is no longer a Nash equilibrium. 
As with lump-sum matching, there are multiple Nash equilibria where group members’ total 
allocations to the group account exactly meet the maximum level of matching, and the symmetric 
equilibrium may serve as a focal point. From a non-cooperative perspective, subjects have an 
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incentive to free ride if they expect others’ group-account allocations to be sufficient to extract 
the maximum level of matching funds.  
Note that the earnings consequences of some allocations in the one-to-one setting differ 
substantially from those in the lump-sum setting. In particular, in both settings subjects face the 
problem of coordinating over whom will provide the group-account allocations to be matched. 
The penalty, however, for not meeting the full-match threshold in the lump-sum setting is larger 
than in the one-to-one setting. In the lump-sum setting, the penalty is $0.36 per individual, 
regardless of how close the total group allocation is to the threshold. In the one-to-one setting, the 
penalty per individual is $0.006 for each token the group falls short of the maximum level of 
matching. Thus, falling a few tokens short of the threshold in the lump-sum setting has a 
relatively large negative effect on earnings, while an identical group-account allocation in the 
one-to-one setting has a much smaller effect. Focusing on this difference in the group-account 
earnings functions leads to the conjecture that lump-sum matching will generate greater group-
account allocations than one-to-one matching.  On the other hand, if group members in the one-
to-one setting realize that matching results in the marginal private benefit of a token allocated to 
the group account exceeding the marginal private cost (MPCR = 1.2), an alternative conjecture is 
that the one-to-one setting will lead to a higher level of group-account allocations. 
Baseline:  No Matching 
 In addition to the two settings with external matching funds, allocation decisions from 
control groups without matching funds were also obtained.  The earnings opportunities in this no-
matching baseline setting paralleled those in the matching-fund settings, but without the strategic 
elements related to matching.  All group members received a message that in each decision round 
an external source would allocate 60 tokens to the group account regardless of the group 
members’ internal allocations.  Thus, the minimum possible group earnings from the group 
account was 60 x $0.024 = $1.44. 
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 An alternative baseline setting was also implemented to investigate whether framing the 
additional 60 tokens as coming from an external source may have affected group members’ 
allocation decisions.2 In the alternative baseline, group members were not given a message 
regarding the source of the external tokens; they simply observed an earnings table that associated 
$1.44 with zero tokens allocated to the group account, instead of $0.00 when zero tokens were 
allocated.  
 The theoretical predictions for both baselines are identical to the standard VCM setting. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is zero tokens allocated to the group account. 
3.B.  Procedures 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the key elements of each decision setting.  Each 
experimental session utilized twelve subjects who were randomly assigned to three four-person 
groups in each of three phases within a session.  Subjects participated in a sequence of ten (phase-
one) decision rounds in a particular setting, were then randomly reassigned to a new four-person 
group for ten (phase-two) decision rounds using a different setting, and were then randomly 
reassigned to another four-person group for the final ten (phase-three) decision rounds using a 
different setting.  Each phase corresponded to a specific decision setting (baseline, lump-sum 
matching, or one-to-one matching) and the order of experimental settings was systematically 
varied across sessions. Thus, data on nine four-person groups were collected in each 12-person 
experimental session:  three groups in each of the three phases, yielding three replications of a 
particular ordering of decision settings. 
The experiments were conducted using NovaNET software at the Interdisciplinary 
Experimental Laboratory at Indiana University-Bloomington during the 2004-2005 academic 
                                                 
2 The baseline setting using the “external source” wording can be interpreted as framing the external tokens 
in a manner similar to a “leadership” contribution.  This relates to a strand of the public goods literature 
that examines the extent to which leadership contributions that occur early in a fund drive can have a 
positive impact on the level of contributions; see for example, Potters, et al. (2001), List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002), List and Rondeau (2003), and Gachter and Renner (2003). 
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year.  Subjects were recruited from a database of volunteers.3  After being seated at 
microcomputer workstations, subjects were given preliminary instructions that were projected on 
a large screen at the front of the room and read aloud by the experimenter.4  Before beginning the 
first ten-round decision-making phase in the session, subjects were informed publicly that: 1) the 
experiment would consist of thirty decision rounds that were broken down into three ten-round 
sequences, 2) for each ten-round sequence they would be randomly reassigned to a four-person 
group, 3) earnings at the beginning of each ten-round sequence would be displayed on their 
computer screen as zero, but, 4) their final earnings would be the sum of earnings across all three 
ten-round sequences, plus a $5 payment for showing up.  Subjects then privately read through a 
set of computerized instructions describing the decision setting and familiarizing them with 
specific screen displays.  While subjects were privately reading the set of computerized 
instructions, an overhead was also presented with summary information related to the private and 
group accounts.  Finally, in the transition from one phase to the next, summary information 
regarding the subsequent decision setting was publicly projected on a large screen at the front of 
the lab and then read aloud by the experimenter. 
The initial experimental design called for two replications of each of the six unique 
permutation orders of the three decision settings.  This led to twelve experimental sessions with 
144 unique subjects.  After completing these twelve sessions and examining the data from the 
baseline setting, which revealed unexpectedly large group-account allocations, the decision was 
made to collect additional data using the alternate baseline setting. Two sessions were conducted 
utilizing the following ordering of decision settings: 1) alternate baseline, lump-sum matching, 
one-to-one matching, and 2) alternate baseline, one-to-one matching, lump-sum matching.  Thus, 
the results reported below are drawn from a total of fourteen experimental sessions using 168 
                                                 
3 A representative from the lab visited various large introductory classes (psychology, geography, and 
economics) to ask students to enlist in the database if they were interested in participating in experiments.  
A wide variety of majors are represented in these large introductory classes.  
4 Instructions are provided in the Appendix for a baseline, lump-sum matching, one-to-one matching 
session.  In addition, instructions are also included for the alternate baseline phase. 
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subjects to form 126 decision-making groups.  Each group interacts over ten decision rounds 
resulting in a total of 1260 observations at the group level. 
4.  Experimental Results 
Subject decisions are analyzed both graphically and econometrically at the group and 
individual level to examine the effects on allocations to the group account of changing the 
experimental setting.  The analysis focuses on three performance measures.  The first measure 
reported is the per-round token allocations to the group account by each four-person group, 
excluding any external matching allocations.  The second performance measure is the per-round 
efficiency, where efficiency is defined as the percentage of maximum possible earnings extracted 
by the group.5  The third performance measure is the per-round within-group dispersion of 
allocations to the group account.  Specifically, the standard deviation about the mean group-
member allocation is calculated.          
4.A.  Graphical Overview 
Figures 2-4 display the mean value of each performance measure for each round pooled 
across experimental phases.  Several very general observations can be made from these figures. 
Observation 1: Mean allocations to the group account are greatest in the lump-sum setting in all 
ten decision rounds, and smallest in the alternate baseline in eight of ten rounds. 
Observation 2: Mean efficiency averaged over all decision rounds is lowest in the lump-sum 
setting. 
Observation 3: Mean dispersion of group-account allocations within groups is lowest in the lump-
sum setting in all ten decision rounds. 
The lump-sum setting appears to be the most effective at generating allocations to the 
group account, as mean allocations in this setting are higher than all other settings for every 
round.  In most rounds, however, average efficiency is lower in the lump-sum setting because of 
                                                 
5 This measure of efficiency is highly positively correlated with the total tokens (group + external) 
allocated to the group account in a round (r = 0.9829). 
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the severe penalty (loss of 60 tokens) if the threshold for the match is not reached.6  This penalty 
is not as severe in the one-to-one setting; and the full match was always present in both baseline 
settings.  The lump-sum setting also appears to diminish the end-game effect (i.e. decreasing 
allocations to the group account in Rounds 9 and 10) that is present in the other experimental 
settings.  However, dispersion of group-account allocations within groups increases in Rounds 9 
and 10 for all experimental settings. 
 4.B.  Statistical Analysis 
 This subsection offers formal tests of the observations presented above by using the 
performance measures as dependent variables in random-effects panel-data models estimated by 
GLS. 
The analysis begins with a regression model estimated using all 1260 group-level 
observations where tokens allocated to the group account by a four-person group (the aggregate 
allocation excluding external tokens) is the dependent variable.  The independent variables are:  a 
lump-sum matching dummy variable (LUMP), a one-to-one matching dummy variable (1TO1), 
an alternative-baseline dummy variable (ALTBASE), two treatment-phase dummy variables  
(PHASEi, i=2, 3), and nine decision-round dummy variables (RNDi, i=2, 3, … ,10).  The 
constant term thus gives the predicted group-account allocation for round 1 of phase 1 under the 
baseline experimental setting.  To account for lack of independence across the ten decision- 
rounds generated by each of the 126 four-person groups, clustered robust standard errors are 
utilized where the data are clustered by these within-group observations.7  Unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with the fourteen 12-person experimental sessions is modeled as a 
random-effect error component.  Table 2 displays the regression coefficient point estimates, 
robust clustered standard errors, and two-tailed significance tests of the coefficients.  In support 
                                                 
6 Groups in the lump-sum setting failed to reach the threshold necessary for matching funds in 18.3% of all 
rounds.   
7 For a detailed discussion of the heteroskedasticity-robust Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance in 
clustered samples see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 24, Section 24.5).  The specific 
implementation utilized here is documented in Rogers (1993). 
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of Observation 1, the table reveals that lump-sum matching generates a significant increase in 
tokens allocated to the group account relative to the original no-matching baseline; however, the 
smaller increase generated by one-to-one matching is not significantly different from the original 
baseline.  As expected, the ALTBASE coefficient is negative; removing the “external source” 
frame from the baseline group-account earnings function tends to reduce group-account 
allocations.  This difference is not significant using a two-tailed test, but is marginally significant 
(p < 0.10) using a one-tailed test, which is justifiable given the clear a priori motivation for the 
framing change.  Wald tests result in rejection of the following pair-wise null hypotheses:  LUMP 
= 1TO1 (p = 0.007), LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.003), and 1TO1 = ALTBASE (p = 0.069).8  
While the primary focus here is on the effects of altering the experimental decision setting, note 
that the treatment-phase dummies are not significant but there are significant differences across 
decision rounds.  In particular, relative to round 1, group-account allocations tend to be slightly 
higher on average in rounds 2-4 and there is a significant drop in group-account allocations in the 
final two rounds.  Referring back to Figure 2, this end-game drop in allocations is evident in all 
except the lump-sum setting. 
 The next performance measure to analyze is efficiency.9  The regression model described 
above is repeated using a group’s per-round efficiency as the dependent variable.  Table 3 
displays the regression coefficients, robust standard errors, and 2-tailed significance tests for the 
coefficients.  In support of Observation 2, the table reveals that lump-sum matching results in a 
small but marginally significant (p = 0.054) decrease in efficiency compared to the baseline.  
                                                 
8 Approximately 2.5% of the observations on the dependent variable (31 of 1260) occur at the fixed upper 
boundary of 100 tokens to the group account, and one observation occurs at the lower boundary of zero.  
To account for these observations at the boundaries of the decision space a two-limit censored-normal 
(Tobit) regression model employing robust clustered standard errors was also estimated.  The coefficients 
and standard errors are all very similar to what is shown in Table 2. 
9 The specific formula for calculating per-round efficiency is:  
160*024.0
tokens)-(100*0.01 tokens)external  tokens(*024.0 ++ , where “tokens” is defined as the aggregate internal 
token allocation to the group account and “external tokens” is defined as the tokens allocated to the group 
account by the external source.  
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Average efficiencies in the other settings are not significantly different from the baseline.  
Despite the differences in penalties from failing to reach the full match, a Wald test comparing 
the pair-wise null hypothesis of LUMP = 1TO1 is not rejected (p = 0.503).  One reason for the 
lack of significance between efficiencies in the lump-sum setting and the one-to-one setting is 
that there were substantially more full matches in the lump-sum setting compared to the one-to-
one setting (81.7% of all rounds compared to 61.4% of all rounds, respectively).  Again, an end-
game effect is present; efficiency decreases by an average of 3% in round 9 and 4% in round 10 
when compared to round 1.  This result is consistent with Figure 3, which displays a decrease in 
efficiency for the final two rounds in all environments but lump-sum matching.10   
The third performance measure to analyze is the dispersion of within-group allocations to 
the group account, where dispersion is calculated by the standard deviation about the mean 
individual allocation to the group account.  The previously described regression model is 
estimated using per-round standard deviation of member allocations as the dependent variable.  
Table 4 displays the regression coefficients, robust standard errors, and 2-tailed significance tests 
for the coefficients.  In support of Observation 3, the table reveals that the lump-sum setting 
results in a marginally significant (p = 0.086) decrease in dispersion compared to the baseline 
setting.  Wald tests comparing pair-wise null hypotheses of LUMP = 1TO1 (p = 0.013) and 
LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.052) are also significant.  A Wald test comparing the remaining pair-
wise null hypothesis (1TO1 = ALTBASE) is not significant at the 10% level.  As can be seen in 
Figure 4, dispersion increases during the final three rounds in each setting.  This observation is 
supported by the regression results, as RND8 (p = 0.083), RND9 (p = 0.000), and RND10 (p = 
0.000) are all positive and significant. 
                                                 
10 Thirty-one of 1260 observations are at the upper efficiency limit (1) and one observation is at the variable 
lower efficiency limit.  (The lower efficiency limits in the baseline and alternate baseline are larger than the 
lower limit in the matching environments.)  To account for these observations at the boundaries of the 
decision space a two-limit censored normal model employing robust clustered standard errors was also 
estimated.  The coefficients and standard errors were very similar to those shown in Table 3. 
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4.C.  Individual Allocations to the Group Account:  Benchmark Frequencies 
   This subsection analyzes group-account allocations at the individual level organized 
around the frequency of occurrence of three benchmark allocations:  the individual maximum (25 
tokens), the symmetric Nash equilibrium (15 tokens), and complete free-riding (0 tokens).11  To 
avoid any possible impact on token allocations from an individual’s participation in multiple 
decision settings, only the phase-one data is examined.  Figure 5 displays relative frequencies of 
these benchmark allocations for each experimental decision setting, pooling across all ten 
decision rounds.12 The percentage of occurrences of the maximum allocation is somewhat higher 
in the matching settings relative to the baseline settings.  Further, the lump-sum setting results in 
more allocations that are consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium compared to the one-to-
one setting, and complete free-riding occurs less frequently under lump-sum matching relative to 
the other three settings.  
To formally examine the significance of these informal observations, negative binomial 
count-data regressions are performed where the dependent variable is the number of rounds that 
an individual submitted a specific benchmark allocation (an integer between 0 and 10).  The 
independent variables are the LUMP, 1TO1, and ALTBASE dummy variables described at the 
beginning of section 4.B.13  Because each individual is part of a four-person group, an 
individual’s token allocations are likely to be influenced by the previous allocations of other 
group members.  To account for this within-group dependence, robust clustered standard errors 
are reported where observations are clustered by decision groups. 
                                                 
11 Allocations near the symmetric Nash equilibrium 16)tokens14( ≤≤ were also examined.  The results 
were very similar to those of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
12 Note that the symmetric Nash equilibrium only applies to lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching.  
The unique Nash equilibrium allocation to the group account is zero tokens for each baseline environment. 
13 A Poisson regression model was estimated first, but the results indicated that the assumption of 
equidispersion (equality of the mean and variance inherent in a Poisson process) must be rejected.  
Following Long (Chapter 8, 1997) and Cameron & Trivedi (Chapter 20, 2005) the negative binomial model 
was utilized to capture overdispersion in the dependent variable. 
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The regression results for each benchmark allocation appear in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  A 
convenient way to interpret the regression coefficients in the negative binomial model is to 
examine incidence-rate ratios (IRR), where ie β=IRR .  IRRs reveal the percentage change in the 
expected count of a benchmark allocation due to a change in the treatment condition, holding all 
other independent variables constant.  For example, in Table 5, the lump-sum setting increases 
the expected frequency for the maximum allocation by a multiple of 1.18 compared to the 
baseline setting, an 18% increase [i.e. 100*(IRR – 1)].  Overall, however, Table 5 shows the 
regression model is not significant when the maximum allocation count is used as the dependent 
variable (p = 0.251).  Table 6 shows that the coefficient for the LUMP dummy is positive and 
significant (p = 0.009); the IRR indicates a 79% increase over one-to-one matching in the 
expected number of rounds where the symmetric Nash equilibrium allocation is submitted.  
Finally, Table 7 shows that the coefficient for the LUMP dummy is negative and marginally 
significant (p = 0.064); the IRR indicates a 62% decrease in the number of complete free-riding 
rounds relative to the baseline level. Wald tests of null hypotheses LUMP = 1TO1 (p = 0.0112) 
and LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.0634) are significant.  The remaining pair-wise null hypothesis, 
1TO1 = ALTBASE, is not rejected at the 10% level.  In summary, lump-sum matching appears 
to: 1) significantly increase the frequency of individual allocations consistent with the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium relative to one-to-one matching, and 2) significantly decrease the frequency of 
complete free riding allocations relative to the other decision settings examined here. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 In the experimental literature on the voluntary provision of public goods, a wide range of 
studies examine alternative institutional arrangements intended to reduce collective action 
problems by creating incentives that facilitate cooperation. The research reported in this study 
adds to this literature by examining behavior in two fund-raising institutions found commonly in 
the field: lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, where matching funds are provided by an 
“external” donor. 
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 The experimental results reveal higher “internal” (within-group) resource allocations to 
the public good under lump-sum matching. An explanation supporting this result is that missing 
the threshold required to provide the full match results in a larger earnings loss in the lump-sum 
setting when compared to the one-to-one setting.  Internal allocations in the lump-sum setting are 
also less dispersed, with more individual allocations at or near the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
prediction and fewer individual allocations consistent with complete free riding.  Neither the 
lump-sum nor the one-to-one setting provides strong support for play of the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium.  Finally, although lump-sum matching leads to greater internal allocations to the 
public good, there is not a significant difference in efficiency between the two matching-funds 
settings due to decision rounds where groups under lump-sum matching do not reach the 
threshold and thus receive no matching funds.  In the experimental settings investigated here, 
external matching funds that are not extracted by a four-person group are wasted rather than 
being carried over to future decision rounds.  In naturally-occurring field settings the validity of 
this rather harsh component of the experimental environment is doubtful.  To the extent that 
unused matching funds are transferred to future endeavors that augment the provision of the 
public good, the efficiency comparisons reported here are of less relevance than the comparison 
of internal resource allocations to the public good. 
 Fund-raising drives suggest several other interesting extensions to the experiments 
reported here. In particular, in field applications organizations often provide information on the 
current status of the fund drive with respect to donations.  Future research will examine this issue, 
using both lump-sum and one-to-one matching, by giving subjects intra-round information on the 
current aggregate allocation to the public good in conjunction with intra-round updating of 
individual allocation decisions.  An “increase-only” allocation rule can be applied to intra-round 
updates of individual decisions.  Larger group sizes, other group-account earnings structures, and 
the use of nonmonetary rewards will also be investigated. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Decision Settings  
 





Individual Token Endowment  
Per-Round 25 25 25 
Decision Rounds 10 10 10 
Per-Token Return to  
Private Account $0.01 $0.01 $0.01 
Individual Per-Token Return 
from Group Account $0.006 
$0.006 for tokens 
other than the 
 60th token 
$0.012 for tokens  
1-60, $0.006 for 
tokens 61 and above 
Total Individual Earnings:  
All Tokens to the  
Private Account            
$6.10 $2.50 $2.50 
Total Individual Earnings: 
Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of 
15 tokens            
NA $8.20 $8.20 
Total Individual Earnings:  
All Tokens to the  
Group Account            
$9.60 $9.60 $9.60 
 
 







Ho: Coefficient = 0 
         Z                     p-value 
CONSTANT 62.2475 3.6981 16.83 0.000 
LUMP 9.0784 3.3413 2.72 0.007 
1TO1 2.4903 3.4299 0.73 0.468 
ALTBASE -8.3085 6.3368 -1.31 0.190 
PHASE2 -2.5347 2.8036 -0.90 0.366 
PHASE3 -2.6133 2.6629 -0.98 0.326 
RND2 4.0476 1.1829 3.42 0.001 
RND3 2.6825 1.4151 1.90 0.058 
RND4 3.4048 1.4653 2.32 0.020 
RND5 1.2937 1.5544 0.83 0.405 
RND6 -0.1349 1.5595 -0.09 0.931 
RND7 0.0873 1.5450 0.06 0.955 
RND8 -0.5238 1.5052 -0.35 0.728 
RND9 -2.7381 1.5614 -1.75 0.080 
RND10 -4.9921 1.7931 -2.78 0.005 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 126 clusters of 10 observations 
Model: χ2(15) = 983.75, p = 0.000 














Ho: Coefficient = 0  
        Z                   p-value 
CONSTANT 0.8781 0.0173 50.64 0.000 
LUMP -0.0357 0.0185 -1.93 0.054 
1TO1 -0.0230 0.0160 -1.44 0.150 
ALTBASE -0.0390 0.0291 -1.34 0.179 
PHASE2 -0.0176 0.0163 -1.08 0.279 
PHASE3 -0.0178 0.0169 -1.05 0.294 
RND2 0.0204 0.0103 1.97 0.049 
RND3 0.0074 0.0132 0.56 0.575 
RND4 0.0055 0.0129 0.43 0.670 
RND5 -0.0091 0.0141 -0.64 0.521 
RND6 -0.0134 0.0149 -0.90 0.367 
RND7 -0.0149 0.0135 -1.11 0.269 
RND8 -0.0141 0.0129 -1.09 0.275 
RND9 -0.0286 0.0143 -2.00 0.046 
RND10 -0.0396 0.0137 -2.90 0.004 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 126 clusters of 10 observations 
Model: χ2(15) = 4713.82, p = 0.000 




Table 4.  Linear Model: Within Group-Standard Deviation of  








Ho: Coefficient = 0  
       Z                    p-value 
CONSTANT 7.4274 0.7486 9.92 0.000 
LUMP -0.9988 0.5817 -1.72 0.086 
1TO1 0.1257 0.5423 0.23 0.817 
ALTBASE 0.8650 1.0414 0.83 0.406 
PHASE2 -0.0421 0.4809 -0.09 0.930 
PHASE3 -0.0647 0.5016 -0.13 0.897 
RND2 -0.2424 0.2249 -1.08 0.281 
RND3 0.1594 0.2796 0.57 0.569 
RND4 0.0351 0.2855 0.12 0.902 
RND5 0.3553 0.3130 1.14 0.256 
RND6 0.4774 0.3198 1.49 0.135 
RND7 0.4384 0.3211 1.37 0.172 
RND8 0.5451 0.3144 1.73 0.083 
RND9 1.3791 0.3153 4.37 0.000 
RND10 1.6131 0.3501 4.61 0.000 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 126 clusters of 10 observations 
  Model: χ2(15) = 243.35, p = 0.000 
Fraction of variance due to session-specific random effect: 0.099 
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Ho: Coefficient = 0  
 Z                  p-value 
CONSTANT  1.0488 0.0908 11.56 0.000 
LUMP 1.1825 0.1676 0.1515 1.11 0.269 
1TO1 1.2482 0.2217 0.1487 1.49 0.136 
ALTBASE 0.9051 -0.0997 0.1790 -0.56 0.578 
Total Number of Observations = 168 = 42 clusters of 4 observations 
Model: χ2(3) = 4.10, p = 0.251 
 
 










Ho: Coefficient = 0  
 Z                  p-value 
CONSTANT  -0.2336 0.1693 -1.38 0.168 
LUMP 1.7895 0.5819 0.2227 2.61 0.009 
Total Number of Observations = 96 = 24 clusters of 4 observations 
Model: χ2(1) = 6.83, p = 0.009 
 
 








Ho: Coefficient = 0  
   Z           p-value 
CONSTANT  -0.1335 0.2902 -0.46 0.645 
LUMP 0.3810 -0.9651 0.5205 -1.85 0.064 
1TO1 1.3333 0.2877 0.3758 0.77 0.444 
ALTBASE 1.1429 0.1335 0.4978 0.27 0.789 
Total Number of Observations = 168 = 42 clusters of 4 observations 

































































































































































(These instructions present what a subject saw when participating in a Baseline, Lump-Sum 





You will participate in a total of 30 decision rounds consisting of three 10-round sequences. 
 
For each 10-round sequence, you will be assigned to a 4-person decision-making group. Groups 
will be reassigned randomly before the start of each 10-round sequence. 
 
Your earnings for each 10-round sequence begin at zero. At the end of all three 10-round 
sequences you will be paid privately in cash the sum of your earnings from all three sequences 
plus the $5 show-up fee. 
 
All decisions are made privately and remain anonymous throughout the experiment.   
 
DO NOT TALK TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT, 
INCLUDING BETWEEN SEQUENCES. 
 
SUMMARY INFORMATION 
(Presented on Overhead while subjects were reading the NovaNET Instructions) 
 
1) All participants are placed into a group of 4. 
 
2) All participants receive 25 tokens at the start of each round. 
 
3) In each round all participants receive $0.01 for each token placed into the private account. 
 
4) In each round all participants receive $0.006 for each token placed into their group account, 
regardless of which group member placed the token into the group account. 
 




This is an exercise in the economics of group decision making.  When you logged into the 
exercise for the first time, you where randomly assigned to a particular group along with 3 other 
people. 
 
The exercise will occur over a sequence of ten decision-making rounds.  At the start of each 
round you will be endowed with 25 “tokens”.  In each round, you must decide how to divide your 
tokens between your “PRIVATE ACCOUNT” and a “GROUP ACCOUNT”.  Each person in the 
group has a Private Account, however, there is only one Group Account for the entire group.  
You will earn $0.01 for each token that you retain in your private account in any decision making 
round.  Thus, if you choose to retain all your 25 tokens in your private account you will earn 
$0.25 in that round from your private account.   
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Everyone in the group will receive the same portion of the earnings from the GROUP 
ACCOUNT.  Thus, if 4 people are in the group, you will receive ¼ = 25% of the group earnings 
from the group account regardless of the number of tokens that you place in the group account. 
 
It is important to realize that EVERYONE in the group receives a ¼ share of the earnings from 
the group account.  This is true for each individual regardless of the number of tokens that the 
individual places in the group account. 
 
Here is a table that shows how both group earnings and your individual earnings from the group 
account will vary with the number of tokens placed in the group account.  This table will be 
displayed on your viewing screen during each round of the exercise. 
 
Examples of Possible Earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT 
Tokens in Group Account  Total       Your 25% share 
  (from the entire group)            Group Earnings                of Group Earnings 
 0    $0.000    $0.000 
 6    $0.144    $0.036 
 13    $0.312    $0.078  
 19    $0.456    $0.114 
 25    $0.600    $0.150 
 31    $0.744    $0.186 
 38    $0.912    $0.228 
 44    $1.056    $0.264 
 50    $1.200    $0.300 
 56    $1.344    $0.336 
 63    $1.512    $0.378 
 69    $1.656    $0.414 
 75    $1.800    $0.450 
 81    $1.944    $0.486 
 88    $2.112    $0.528 
 94    $2.256    $0.564 
 100    $2.400    $0.600 
 
The first row of the table indicates that the MINIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the 
group account is zero.  This will occur if everyone in the group places no tokens in the group 
account and will result in group earnings from the group account of $0. 
 
The last row indicates that the MAXIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the group 
account is 100.  This is the summation of the individual token endowments for the entire group 
and would result in group earnings from the group account of $2.4. 
 
The table reveals that for token 1 through token 100 placed in the group account, total group 
earnings from the group account increase by $0.024 per token.  Thus, each individual’s earnings 
from the group account increase by $0.024 / 4 = $0.006 per token over this range.   
 
YOUR ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 25 ; Group size: 4 
TOTAL GROUP ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 100 
Each token placed in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT earns $0.01 
 
The information that just appeared above the table will appear on your display each round.  You 
will also be able to see “Total Group Earnings” and “Your Share of Group Earnings” for any 
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level of “Tokens in Group Account” not already displayed in the table.  You will be able to 
access this option by pressing the -LAB- key. 
 
Prior to entering your decisions for rounds 2 – 10 you will be shown the results from the previous 
round.  You will also be able to review the results from any previous round by pressing the -
DATA- key. 
 
You will be able to review the instructions prior to making your decision in any round by 
pressing the -HELP- key. 
 
In order to make sure you understand how each round will proceed, let’s work through an 
instructive example of the decision entry process that you will go through each round. 
 
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AFFECTING EARNINGS FROM THE GROUP ACCOUNT 
 
In each decision round an “external source” will place 60 tokens in the group account in addition 
to any tokens allocated to the group account by group members.  The external source is a 
computerized robot player that is not a human group member.  The tokens placed in the group 
account by the external source will increase all group members’ earnings from the group account. 
 
The maximum possible tokens placed in the group account is 100 from group members and 60 
from the external source for a total of 160.  The table showing group and individual earnings from 
various levels of tokens allocated to the group account will be adjusted to reflect this expanded 
upper limit.. 
 
Authors note: During the decision phase, subjects viewed a payoff table for the group account 
that went from 0 to 160 possible tokens. 
 
Overhead Shown Prior to the Second 10-round Sequence of Lump-Sum Matching: 
You have now completed the first 10-round sequence and will begin the second 10-round 
sequence. 
 
You will now be assigned randomly to a new 4-person group. 
 
The class file for this 10-round sequence is “(insert class file name).” 
 
Log in with the same last name. 
 
The instructions for the experiment remain the same, except for the “special instructions” that 
occur at the end of the instructions. 
 
Carefully read the “special instructions.” They explain a change in how the tokens from the 
external source are placed into the Group Account. 
 
Your earnings for each 10-round sequence begin at zero. At the end of all three 10-round 
sequences you will be paid privately in cash the sum of your earnings from all three sequences 
plus the $5 show-up fee. 
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DO NOT TALK TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT, 
INCLUDING BETWEEN SEQUENCES. 
 
SUMMARY INFORMATION for Phase 2 
(Presented on Overhead while subjects were reading the NovaNET Instructions) 
 
1) All participants are placed into a group of 4. 
 
2) All participants receive 25 tokens at the start of each round. 
 
3) In each round all participants receive $0.01 for each token placed into the private account. 
 
4) In each round all participants receive $0.006 for each token placed into their group account, 
regardless of which group member placed the token into the group account. 
 
5) In each round where the total number of tokens allocated to the group account equals or 
exceeds 60 tokens, an “external source” will place an additional 60 additional tokens in the group 
account.  The external source is a computerized robot player that is not a human group member.   
 
In other words, if group members allocate a total of 0 through 59 tokens to the group account, 
then the external source will not place any additional tokens in the group account.  If group 
members place 60 through 100 tokens in the group account, the external source will place an 
additional 60 tokens in the group account.  These tokens will increase all group members’ 
earnings from the group account. 
 
Screen Prints for NovaNET Instructions: Lump-Sum Match Setting 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an exercise in the economics of group decision making.  When you logged into the 
exercise for the first time, you where randomly assigned to a particular group along with 3 other 
people. 
 
The exercise will occur over a sequence of ten decision-making rounds.  At the start of each 
round you will be endowed with 25 “tokens”.  In each round, you must decide how to divide your 
tokens between your “PRIVATE ACCOUNT” and a “GROUP ACCOUNT”.  Each person in the 
group has a Private Account, however, there is only one Group Account for the entire group.  
You will earn $0.01 for each token that you retain in your private account in any decision making 
round.  Thus, if you choose to retain all your 25 tokens in your private account you will earn 
$0.25 in that round from your private account.   
 
Everyone in the group will receive the same portion of the earnings from the GROUP 
ACCOUNT.  Thus, if 4 people are in the group, you will receive ¼ = 25% of the group earnings 
from the group account regardless of the number of tokens that you place in the group account. 
 
It is important to realize that EVERYONE in the group receives a ¼ share of the earnings from 
the group account.  This is true for each individual regardless of the number of tokens that the 
individual places in the group account. 
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Here is a table that shows how both group earnings and your individual earnings from the group 
account will vary with the number of tokens placed in the group account.  This table will be 
displayed on your viewing screen during each round of the exercise. 
 
 
Examples of Possible Earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT 
Tokens in Group Account  Total   Your 25% share 
(from the entire group)      Group Earnings              of Group Earnings 
 0    $0.000    $0.000 
 6    $0.144    $0.036 
 13    $0.312    $0.078  
 19    $0.456    $0.114 
 25    $0.600    $0.150 
 31    $0.744    $0.186 
 38    $0.912    $0.228 
 44    $1.056    $0.264 
 50    $1.200    $0.300 
 56    $1.344    $0.336 
 63    $1.512    $0.378 
 69    $1.656    $0.414 
 75    $1.800    $0.450 
 81    $1.944    $0.486 
 88    $2.112    $0.528 
 94    $2.256    $0.564 
 100    $2.400    $0.600 
 
The first row of the table indicates that the MINIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the 
group account is zero.  This will occur if everyone in the group places no tokens in the group 
account and will result in group earnings from the group account of $0. 
 
The last row indicates that the MAXIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the group 
account is 100.  This is the summation of the individual token endowments for the entire group 
and would result in group earnings from the group account of $2.4. 
 
The table reveals that for token 1 through token 100 placed in the group account, total group 
earnings from the group account increase by $0.024 per token.  Thus, each individual’s earnings 
from the group account increase by $0.024 / 4 = $0.006 per token over this range.   
 
YOUR ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 25 ; Group size: 4 
TOTAL GROUP ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 100 
Each token placed in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT earns $0.01 
 
The information that just appeared above the table will appear on your display each round.  You 
will also be able to see “Total Group Earnings” and “Your Share of Group Earnings” for any 
level of “Tokens in Group Account” not already displayed in the table.  You will be able to 
access this option by pressing the -LAB- key. 
 
Prior to entering your decisions for rounds 2 – 10 you will be shown the results from the previous 




You will be able to review the instructions prior to making your decision in any round by 
pressing the -HELP- key. 
 
In order to make sure you understand how each round will proceed, let’s work through an 
instructive example of the decision entry process that you will go through each round. 
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AFFECTING EARNINGS FROM THE GROUP ACCOUNT 
 
In each decision round where the total number of tokens allocated to the group account by group 
members equals or exceeds 60 tokens, an “external source” will place 60 additional tokens in the 
group account.  The external source is a computerized robot player that is not a human group 
member. 
 
In other words, if group members allocate a total of 0 through 59 tokens to the group account, 
then the external source will not place any additional tokens in the group account.  If group 
members place 60 through 100 tokens in the group account, the external source will place an 
additional 60 tokens in the group account.  These tokens will increase all group members’ 
earnings from the group account. 
 
The maximum possible tokens placed in the group account is 100 from group members and 60 
from the external source for a total of 160.  The table showing group and individual earnings from 
various levels of tokens allocated to the group account will be adjusted to reflect this expanded 
upper limit. 
 
Authors note: During the decision phase, subjects viewed a payoff table for the group account 
that went from 0 to 160 possible tokens. 
 
Overhead Shown Prior to the Third 10-round Sequence of One-to-One Matching: 
You have now completed the second 10-round sequence and will begin the third 10-round 
sequence. 
 
You will now be assigned randomly to a new 4-person group. 
 
The class file for this 10-round sequence is “(insert class file name).” 
 
Log in with the same last name. 
 
The instructions for the experiment remain the same, except for the “special instructions” that 
occur at the end of the instructions. 
 
Carefully read the “special instructions.” They explain a change in how the tokens from the 
external source are placed into the Group Account. 
 
Your earnings for each 10-round sequence begin at zero. At the end of all three 10-round 
sequences you will be paid privately in cash the sum of your earnings from all three sequences 
plus the $5 show-up fee. 
 
DO NOT TALK TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT, 
INCLUDING BETWEEN SEQUENCES 
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SUMMARY INFORMATION for Phase 3 
(Presented on Overhead while subjects were reading the NovaNET Instructions) 
 
1) All participants are placed into a group of 4. 
 
2) All participants receive 25 tokens at the start of each round. 
 
3) In each round all participants receive $0.01 for each token placed into the private account. 
 
4) In each round all participants receive $0.006 for each token placed into their group account, 
regardless of which group member placed the token into the group account. 
 
5) In each decision round, for each token allocated to the group account by group members in the 
range of 1 through 60 tokens, an “external source” will also place a token in the group account.  
The external source is a computerized robot player that is not a group member. 
 
In other words, in the range from 1 through 60 tokens allocated to the group account, the external 
source will match each token on a one-for-one basis.  The one-for-one matching ends when the 










This is an exercise in the economics of group decision making.  When you logged into the 
exercise for the first time, you where randomly assigned to a particular group along with 3 other 
people. 
 
The exercise will occur over a sequence of ten decision-making rounds.  At the start of each 
round you will be endowed with 25 “tokens”.  In each round, you must decide how to divide your 
tokens between your “PRIVATE ACCOUNT” and a “GROUP ACCOUNT”.  Each person in the 
group has a Private Account, however, there is only one Group Account for the entire group.  
You will earn $0.01 for each token that you retain in your private account in any decision making 
round.  Thus, if you choose to retain all your 25 tokens in your private account you will earn 
$0.25 in that round from your private account.   
 
Everyone in the group will receive the same portion of the earnings from the GROUP 
ACCOUNT.  Thus, if 4 people are in the group, you will receive ¼ = 25% of the group earnings 
from the group account regardless of the number of tokens that you place in the group account. 
 
It is important to realize that EVERYONE in the group receives a ¼ share of the earnings from 
the group account.  This is true for each individual regardless of the number of tokens that the 
individual places in the group account. 
 
Here is a table that shows how both group earnings and your individual earnings from the group 
account will vary with the number of tokens placed in the group account.  This table will be 
displayed on your viewing screen during each round of the exercise. 
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Examples of Possible Earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT 
Tokens in Group Account  Total   Your 25% share 
(from the entire group)      Group Earnings              of Group Earnings 
 0    $0.000    $0.000 
 6    $0.144    $0.036 
 13    $0.312    $0.078  
 19    $0.456    $0.114 
 25    $0.600    $0.150 
 31    $0.744    $0.186 
 38    $0.912    $0.228 
 44    $1.056    $0.264 
 50    $1.200    $0.300 
 56    $1.344    $0.336 
 63    $1.512    $0.378 
 69    $1.656    $0.414 
 75    $1.800    $0.450 
 81    $1.944    $0.486 
 88    $2.112    $0.528 
 94    $2.256    $0.564 
 100    $2.400    $0.600 
 
The first row of the table indicates that the MINIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the 
group account is zero.  This will occur if everyone in the group places no tokens in the group 
account and will result in group earnings from the group account of $0. 
 
The last row indicates that the MAXIMUM number of tokens that can be placed in the group 
account is 100.  This is the summation of the individual token endowments for the entire group 
and would result in group earnings from the group account of $2.4. 
 
The table reveals that for token 1 through token 100 placed in the group account, total group 
earnings from the group account increase by $0.024 per token.  Thus, each individual’s earnings 
from the group account increase by $0.024 / 4 = $0.006 per token over this range.   
 
YOUR ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 25 ; Group size: 4 
TOTAL GROUP ENDOWMENT of tokens per round: 100 
Each token placed in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT earns $0.01 
 
The information that just appeared above the table will appear on your display each round.  You 
will also be able to see “Total Group Earnings” and “Your Share of Group Earnings” for any 
level of “Tokens in Group Account” not already displayed in the table.  You will be able to 
access this option by pressing the -LAB- key. 
 
Prior to entering your decisions for rounds 2 – 10 you will be shown the results from the previous 
round.  You will also be able to review the results from any previous round by pressing the -
DATA- key. 
 
You will be able to review the instructions prior to making your decision in any round by 
pressing the -HELP- key. 
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In order to make sure you understand how each round will proceed, let’s work through an 
instructive example of the decision entry process that you will go through each round. 
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AFFECTING EARNINGS FROM THE GROUP ACCOUNT 
 
In each decision round, for each token allocated to the group account by group members in the 
range from 1 through 60 tokens, an “external source” will also place a token in the group account.  
The external source is a computerized robot player that is not a group member. 
 
In other words, in the range from 1 through 60 tokens allocated to the group account, the external 
source will match each token on a one-for-one basis.  The one-for-one matching ends when the 
external source has placed 60 tokens in the group account. 
 
For example, if group members allocate a total of 30 tokens to the group account, then the 
external source will add 30 tokens to the group account.  Alternatively, if group members allocate 
70 tokens to the group account the external source will add 60 tokens to the group account (the 
one-for-one matching maximum).  These extra tokens will increase all group members’ earnings 
from the group account. 
 
The maximum possible tokens placed in the group account is 100 from group members and 60 
from the external source for a total of 160.  The table showing group and individual earnings from 
various levels of tokens allocated to the group account will be adjusted to reflect this expanded 
upper limit. 




You will participate in a total of 30 decision rounds consisting of three 10-round sequences. 
 
For each 10-round sequence, you will be assigned to a 4-person decision-making group. Groups 
will be reassigned randomly before the start of each 10-round sequence. 
 
Your earnings for each 10-round sequence begin at zero. At the end of all three 10-round 
sequences you will be paid privately in cash the sum of your earnings from all three sequences 
plus the $5 show-up fee. 
 
All decisions are made privately and remain anonymous throughout the experiment.   
 
DO NOT TALK TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT ANY TIME DURING THE EXPERIMENT, 
INCLUDING BETWEEN SEQUENCES. 
 
SUMMARY INFORMATION 
(Presented on Overhead while subjects were reading the NovaNET Instructions) 
 
1) All participants are placed into a group of 4. 
 
2) All participants receive 25 tokens at the start of each round. 
 
3) In each round all participants receive $0.01 for each token placed into the private account. 
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4) In each round all participants receive $0.006 for each token placed into their group account, 
regardless of which group member placed the token into the group account. 
 
Screen Prints for NovaNET Instructions: Alternate Baseline Setting 
 
Authors note: The instructions for the alternate baseline setting are identical to the baseline 
setting with two exceptions: 1) the table now has $1.44 as earnings when 0 tokens are placed in 
the group account; and 2) no special instructions occur after the example is presented. 
 
Overhead Shown Prior to the Second 10-round Sequence: 
 
You have now completed the first 10-round sequence and will begin the second 10-round 
sequence. 
 
You will now be assigned randomly to a new 4-person group. 
 
The class file for this 10-round sequence is “(insert class file name).” 
 
Log in with the same last name. 
 
The instructions for the experiment remain the same, except for two changes. 
 
First, look carefully at the group account earnings table and note that zero tokens to the group 
account will generate zero earnings from the group account. 
 
Second, carefully read the “special instructions” that occur at the end of the instructions.  They 
explain that now an “external source” may place additional tokens into the Group Account.  
These tokens will increase all group members’ earnings from the group account.  The “external 
source” is a computerized robot player that is not a human group member. 
 
Your earnings for each 10-round sequence begin at zero. At the end of all three 10-round 
sequences you will be paid privately in cash the sum of your earnings from all three sequences 
plus the $5 show-up fee. 
 
 
 
 
